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“Written on their hearts”:
Thinking with Luther about
Scripture, Natural Law, and the
Moral Life
GARY M. SIMPSON
rouble has been brewing for some time now with respect to Scripture and the
moral life. Yet, the turmoil is nothing new. Martin Luther grieved, “Many
learned men have not known how far Moses ought to be taught.” “[E]ven today,
many great preachers still stumble over it. They do not know how to preach Moses,
nor how properly to regard his books….All the while they mislead the poor people
and drive them to destruction.”1
In today’s world of rapid change, high mobility, and global plurality, moral
relativism has become a lively option, at least on the surface. In response to relativ-
ism, many Christians have taken a reactionary turn. They have adopted the dis-
course of “the authority of the Bible” without discerning, with Luther, “how far
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Those who ignore Luther’s critical agility in moral reasoning based on natural
law in favor of a reactionary turn to a regime of biblical law create “misery and
tribulation,” as Luther lamented, and seriously enfeeble the Christian faith for
life today. Christians rightly use their God-given powers of reason to work out af-
fairs in the present order.
1Martin Luther, How Christians Should Regard Moses (1525), in Luther’s Works (hereafter LW), ed. Jaroslav
Pelikan and Helmut Lehmann, 55 vols. (Philadelphia and St. Louis: Fortress and Concordia, 1955–1986) 35:174.
Hereafter page numbers from this sermon will be cited in parentheses in the text.
Moses ought to be taught.” By doing so they recklessly succumb to the opposite
modern extreme, that of authoritarian absolutism with its biblicistic mystique that
simplifies and subjugates all things moral under a regime of biblical law.2
Luther, however, taught that the Scriptures themselves warrant a different
approach, beyond a mistaken regime of biblical law. The Scriptures teach us to ap-
proach moral questions by way of natural law reasoning. The peoples of the earth
through God’s creative providence have the law “written on their hearts”—scriptum
in cordibus suis—to use St. Paul’s now classic phrase from Rom 2:15. Luther inher-
ited the natural law approach from the tradition and received it appreciatively.3 He
also severely criticized how the medieval church appropriated natural law for
soteriological purposes. Finally, he innovatively revised the classical natural law
tradition of moral reasoning in a helpful way.
A critically revised natural law approach to moral reasoning still offers a
better way beyond both relativism and absolutism. In this essay we will travel part
of the way toward a critical revision of natural law by thinking with Luther about
natural law and the moral life under three headings: Scripture and natural law, nat-
ural law and salvation, and natural law and reason. Luther’s key innovation in nat-
ural law moral reasoning and its coordination with Christian neighborly love must
wait for another occasion.
SCRIPTURE AND NATURAL LAW
By the mid-1520s, growing numbers of people who claimed to be followers of
Luther had in fact veered from his basic insights regarding the Scriptures and the
moral life. They had invented their own “the authority of the Bible” slogan. “God’s
word, God’s word,” they would say. These fans of Luther had devolved into biblical
fanatics. Their “God’s word, God’s word” slogan functioned like the all-too-com-
mon bumper sticker, “God said it, I believe it, that settles it.” “They are absurd as
they rage and fume, chattering to people, ‘God’s word, God’s word!’” Luther pro-
tested (174). “Misery and tribulation have come out of this sort of thing” (169).
The problem was so serious and widespread that over the course of more
than two years Luther devoted a series of seventy-seven sermons on the book of
Exodus to the issue. He titled the twenty-ninth sermon How Christians Should Re-
gard Moses (August 27, 1525). It quickly became a hit and within two years the
publishers placed it at the beginning of a collection of Luther’s sermons on Gene-
sis. Rightly, they made it the interpretive key to the entire collection.
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2For Luther’s insight into the derivative authority of Scripture based on the gospel, see my “first install-
ment” of this present essay: Gary M. Simpson, “‘You shall bear witness to me’: Thinking with Luther about Christ
and the Scriptures,” Word & World 29/4 (2009) 380–388.
3Martin Luther, Lectures on Romans (1516), LW 25:19–20. When he lectured on Romans, Luther routinely
used the Ordinary Gloss, a twelfth-century running commentary on the Scriptures, compiled out of patristic
sources, which became the standard scholarly compendium that handed on the traditions of interpretation. For a
translation of the entry on Rom 2:15 see Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005) 4.
Luther’s sermon, based on Exod 20, harbors seven basic insights. First, and
unsurprisingly, he led off with the basic scriptural distinction between law and
promise and its correlate, God’s establishment of two kingdoms or two ways of
ruling, one temporal and the other spiritual. God’s law rules the temporal king-
dom and comprises the expanse of human moral life. The law also always exposes
us as sinners and in this way prepares for the gospel promise. The gospel establishes
and sustains our spiritual life by promising that God justifies the ungodly by their
faith alone and that such justifying faith generates love for our neighbors and their
neighborhoods. Christians rightly pay attention to Moses for three reasons: First,
and this is “the best thing” (169), Moses proclaims “the promises and pledges of
God about Christ” (168) and these pertain to all people at all times and in all
places. Second, Moses offers “many fine examples of both faith and unfaith” (173).
Third, and this is the special burden of this sermon, Moses is a “teacher” who dis-
tinguishes between moral wisdom that “pertains to” and “binds” everyone and
moral wisdom that “pertains to” and “binds” only those in Moses’ own time and
place (164–166).
The sermon’s second insight draws its breath from Paul’s phrase in Rom
2:15. God writes the law on the hearts of all the nations of the world. Luther refer-
enced this phrase no less than five times in the sermon, and it remained a com-
monplace throughout his countless writings. He was quite conventional here. The
main traditions of medieval theology routinely cited Rom 2:15 as the classical text
that summarizes an entire biblical teaching: first, that God establishes and sustains
the natural law—“written with the finger of God…[b]y nature and indelibly…im-
printed on their [the nations’] minds”4—as the enduring moral basis of terrestrial
life; and second, that natural law is to be distinguished from all particular instances
of existing civil law—what the tradition called “positive law.” As life’s most basic
moral wisdom, natural law pertains to all nations at all times and in all places. Posi-
tive law, on the other hand, while it should be rooted in the moral wisdom of natu-
ral law, is always formulated by humans and is always quite particularly situated in
the concrete contexts of time and place. In this sense positive law is both
time-bound and timely.
Natural law is a practical first principle in the sphere of morality; it forbids evil
and commends good. Positive law is a decision that takes circumstances into
account and conforms with natural law on credible grounds. The basis of natu-
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4Martin Luther, Lectures on Romans, LW 25:19.
Moses is a “teacher” who distinguishes between moral
wisdom that “pertains to” and “binds” everyone and moral
wisdom that “pertains to” and “binds” only those in
Moses’ own time and place
ral law is God who has created this light, but the basis of positive law is civil au-
thority.5
Nowhere in How Christians Should Regard Moses did Luther offer a detailed descrip-
tion or theory of natural law. He simply employed the conventional basics, which he
found scripturally warranted and morally sound.
Luther’s third insight builds on the distinction between natural law and posi-
tive law with respect to Moses’ law. On the one hand, the biblical law of Moses
shares one feature with the natural law in that it was written by God. On the other
hand, and unlike natural law, it pertains only to the Jewish people, since God did
not write it on the hearts of the peoples of the world.6 In this way the biblical law of
Moses shares a crucial feature with positive law, that is, it is particularly situated in
the concrete contexts of time and place. The Israelites, Luther noted, lived directly
under God in a unique “middle, half spiritual, half temporal” kingdom, in a theoc-
racy, we would say today. “Here the law of Moses has its place” (164).
The factious “God’s word” sloganeers ignored the distinction between natu-
ral law and biblical law and thus “desire to govern people according to the letter of
the law of Moses….But we will not have this sort of thing” (164). The sloganeers
browbeat people, “‘Thus says Moses,’ etc.,” because they “want to saddle us with
Moses and all his commandments. We will just skip that,” Luther bluntly and pro-
vocatively protested (165). He knew, of course, that his rhetoric would scandalize
the pious biblical enthusiasts. Mostly, he was trying to embolden those too easily
bullied by the sectarian “God’s word, God’s word” slogan. “Here you simply reply:
Moses has nothing to do with us. If I were to accept Moses in one commandment, I
would have to accept the entire Moses” (165). Moses’ law “is no longer binding on
us because it was given only to the people of Israel” (164). “Therefore it is clear
enough that Moses is the lawgiver of the Jews and not of the Gentiles” (165). Mo-
ses’ law, noted Luther, “is the Sachsenspiegel for the Jews” (167), Sachsenspiegel be-
ing the positive legal code of medieval Saxony.7
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5Martin Luther, Table Talk, no. 3911 (July 7, 1538), LW 54:293; also see Martin Luther, Lectures on Genesis
6–14 (1536), LW 2:160. Luther is quite familiar with the conventional distinctions within natural law ethics and ju-
risprudence. In this remark, for instance, Luther used the notion of the first principle of practical reason, which is
usually stated as “do no harm” (the principle of non-malevolence) and “do good” (the principle of beneficence).
There are indeed different versions of natural law prior to Luther’s time. Luther’s relationship to these versions is
beyond the scope of this essay. For an insightful analysis of these versions see, Stephen J. Graybill, Rediscovering the
Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006).
6Luther, LW 25:180.
7Also see Martin Luther, “Against the Heavenly Prophets” (1525), LW 40:98; also Martin Luther, “Lectures
on Galatians” (1519), LW 27:355.
Luther knew, of course, that his rhetoric would scandalize
the pious biblical enthusiasts. Mostly, he was trying to
embolden those too easily bullied by the sectarian “God’s
word, God’s word” slogan.
Luther’s fourth insight comes as an interpretive guideline that clarifies the
distinction between natural law and biblical law. When sloganeers come prosecut-
ing “God’s word, God’s word,” then say:
It is all God’s word. But let God’s word be what it may, I must pay attention and
know to whom God’s word is addressed….One must deal cleanly with the
Scriptures. From the beginning the word has come to us in various ways. It is
not enough simply to look and see whether God has said it; rather we must look
and see to whom it has been spoken, whether it fits us. That makes all the dif-
ference between night and day….You must keep your eye on the word that ap-
plies to you, that is spoken to you. (170)
A few years later Luther dealt with numerous marriage matters, including polygamy,
in a similar way.
One must deal prudently with the laws of Moses, for his rule in marriage mat-
ters is of a completely different character than ours….Moses’ laws cannot be
valid simply and completely in all respects with us. We have to take into con-
sideration the character and ways of our land when we want to make or apply
laws and rules, because our rules and laws are based on the character of our
land and its ways and not on those of the land of Moses, just as Moses’ laws are
based on the ways and character of his people and not those of ours.8
With his fifth insight Luther highlighted what is perhaps self-evident, that the
moral wisdom of natural law also appears within the biblical law of Moses, most
patently in the Ten Commandments. “To be sure, the Gentiles have certain laws in
common with the Jews, such as these: there is only one God, no one is to do wrong
to another, no one is to commit adultery or murder or steal, and others like them.
This is written by nature into their hearts” (164). The natural law, however, “was
not promulgated for the first time in the Decalog but is written in the hearts of all
men.”9 Furthermore, the Ten Commandments include elements, such as the pro-
hibition against images and the designation of the seventh day as the day of rest,
that go “beyond the natural law…[and are] not supported by the natural law.”
These are positive law that does not pertain to all people at all times and in all
places.10 Still, in his judgment “the natural laws were never so orderly and well writ-
ten” 11 as they were in the Decalogue, yet even “new decalogues” are possible.12 Fi-
nally, it is important to remember that natural law also gains celebrated voice in
the two great Love Commandments—love God above all things and love your
neighbor as yourself—as well as in the Golden Rule, which all appear in the New
Testament and also on the lips of Jesus himself.13
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8Martin Luther, “On Marriage Matters” (1530), LW 46:291.
9Martin Luther, Lectures on Genesis 1–5 (1535), LW 1:277–278.
10Luther, LW 40:97.
11Luther, LW 40:98.
12Martin Luther, Theses Concerning Faith and Law (1535), LW 34:112.
13Luther, LW 1:277; also Luther, LW 40:96–98. It is for this reason that Luther at one point in How Christians
Should Regard Moses coupled natural law with the New Testament (LW 35:165).
Luther’s sixth insight shows the proper relationship between Moses’ law and
natural law. Like any positive law, Moses’ law should have its basic premises rooted
in natural law and then crafted to the given circumstances of time and place. Mo-
ses’ law is binding on people in Luther’s times only “so far as he [Moses] agrees
with the natural law,” a criterion that Luther emphasized no less than six times in
his sermon (173).
Luther’s final insight addresses the question that the sermon raised by its very
title: How Christians Should Regard Moses. We should regard Moses as our
“teacher” (165), but not as our “lawgiver” (164), not as our “ruler” (164), not as
our “master” (165). To regard Moses as lawgiver, ruler, or master is to obligate us
to obey, which is entailed in each of these possible titles. Instead, argued Luther, we
should regard Moses as a teacher, to whom we should listen and from whom we
should learn, which is entailed in the title teacher. The title teacher does not, how-
ever, obligate obedience. Rather, we are entitled, indeed obligated, to test out for
ourselves whether what the teacher says “fits” our situation (170), whether it is “to
our advantage” (173). Whenever Moses’ laws exceed natural law, they “are dead
and gone, except insofar as I gladly and willingly accept something from Moses, as
if I said, ‘This is how Moses ruled, and it seems fine to me, so I will follow him in
this or that particular’” (166).
Among Luther’s numerous examples of Moses as a helpful teacher are the
levirate marriage laws of Deut 25, by which the wife of a deceased husband would
be married by his brother or close relative, whether he is already married or not.
“Now this is a very good rule,” Luther exclaimed (167). We likely would have a dif-
ferent moral judgment from both Moses and Luther. And Luther would be all right
with that; indeed, he would expect such difference on scriptural grounds.
In summary, Luther’s scriptural threshold for moral obligation is natural law,
not biblical law. In other words, Scripture teaches that natural law trumps biblical
law every time. Therefore, the moral authority of positive biblical law is limited to
its biblical time and place. Biblical law authoritatively binds only where it already
agrees with natural law, because binding moral authority rests in natural law. That
being the case, positive biblical law always yields its authority to the moral wisdom
of natural law working its way through the making of positive law in different
times and places. Surely we can agree, “Luther was no Biblicist.”14
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(London: SPCK, 1960) 52.
biblical law authoritatively binds only where it already
agrees with natural law, because binding moral authority
rests in natural law
NATURAL LAW AND SALVATION
Luther’s deep appreciation for the tradition of natural law moral reflection
also came with a stunning critique of how the dominant forms of medieval theol-
ogy had put natural law to use in matters of salvation. Here we come to the heart of
Luther’s critical reformation of theology and church practice, a story that we must
conspicuously foreshorten here.
Medieval theology had developed the natural law tradition of moral reflec-
tion under the heavy influence of auricular confession, “no doubt the single most
influential factor” in the use of natural law.15 In auricular confession, the priest
would meticulously probe a penitent’s personal vices, which were the obverse of
the four natural virtues in Aristotle’s natural law ethics. Once the vices were de-
tected, the priest could prescribe the necessary virtues for which the penitent
should strive. Practicing the natural virtues, along with the help of grace and the
supernatural virtues, would advance the penitent toward salvation. The dominant
forms of medieval theology had all framed auricular confession and the teaching of
salvation according to Aristotle’s basic moral maxim: “become righteous by doing
righteous deeds.”16
Luther judged this medieval constellation of theology and practice quite un-
ambiguously. “Virtually the entire Ethics of Aristotle is the worst enemy of
grace…[and] is to theology as darkness is to light.”17 Theology ad modum Aristotelis—
“in the manner of Aristotle”—always puts reason, which is the companion of nat-
ural law ethics, on the throne of judgment, mediating between God and humans.18
Luther protested:
[I]t is necessary to make a distinction between God and men, between spiritual
and temporal things. In human affairs man’s judgment suffices. For these
things, he needs no light but that of reason….For these, our natural light is suf-
ficient. But in divine things, the things concerning God, and in which we must
conduct ourselves acceptably with him and must secure [eternal] happiness for
ourselves, human nature is absolutely blind, staring stone-blind, unable to rec-
ognize in the slightest degree what these things are.19
When reason occupies the throne in matters of salvation, Luther’s rhetoric was un-
sparing. Reason, so enthroned, becomes “the lovely whore,” the “arch-prostitute,”
“the Devil’s whore,” and “the Devil’s bride.”20 On the other hand, when reason is
employed for things earthly, Luther held it in the highest esteem.
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15For the confluence of auricular confession and natural law moral reflection between the sixth and six-
teenth centuries, see John Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition (Ox-
ford: Clarendon, 1987) 1–36.
16This oft-quoted maxim of Aristotle appears in Nicomachean Ethics, II. 1, 1103b.
17Martin Luther, Disputation against Scholastic Theology (1517) LW 31:12 (nos. 41 and 50).
18Luther, LW 25:261.
19Martin Luther, Sermon on Epiphany (Isaiah 60:1–6) (1522), in John Lenker, ed., Sermons of Martin Luther:
The Church Postils, vol. 6 (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995) 319.
20Martin Luther, The Last Sermon in Wittenberg (Rom. 12:3) (1546) LW 51:374; Luther, LW 40:175.
NATURAL LAW AND REASON
Luther approved the conventional coupling of natural law and natural rea-
son. “At present people are beginning to praise natural law and natural reason as
the source from which all written law has come and issued. This is true, of course,
and the praise is well placed.”21 For with “the noble gem called natural law and rea-
son” God sets humans apart from the other animals.22
And it is certainly true that reason is the most important and the highest in
rank among all things [earthly] and, in comparison with other things of this
life, the best and something divine. It is the inventor and mentor of all the arts,
medicines, laws, and of whatever wisdom, power, virtue, and glory men possess
in this life. By virtue of this fact it ought to be named the essential difference by
which man is distinguished from the animals and other things. Holy Scripture
also makes it lord over the earth, birds, fish, and cattle, saying, “Have domin-
ion” [Gen 1:28]. That is, that it is a sun and a kind of god appointed to adminis-
ter these things in this life.23
In short, God “has subjected temporal rule and all physical life to reason (Gen 2).”24
Because God writes the natural law on the hearts of the world’s peoples,
Christians have no corner on moral wisdom.
God is a gentle and wealthy Lord. He casts much gold, silver, wealth, domin-
ions, and kingdoms among the godless, as though it were chaff or sand. Thus he
casts great intelligence, wisdom, languages, and oratorical ability among them,
too, so that His dear Christians look like mere children, fools, and beggars by
comparison.25
Luther regularly encouraged people, especially admonishing those who exercise any
authority over others, to study the worldly wisdom of Virgil, Demosthenes, Plato,
Aristotle, Livy, Terence, Hammurabi, and a host of others, especially Cicero.26
While Luther was quite familiar with the usual conventions of the natural law
tradition, he most often availed himself of the tradition’s commonplaces without
using its technical jargon. One important example is the basic distinction and co-
ordination of “nature as nature” and “nature as reason.”27 In order to implement
the first principle of practical reason, one must know what is generally harmful to
human beings and what is generally good for them. This means first of all knowing
the basic nature of human nature, the specifics of what makes the human species
human. Reason is the primary capacity for discovering the nature of human na-
ture, and the tradition’s term for this capacity is “speculative reason.” Speculative
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21Martin Luther, Commentary on Psalm 101 (1534), LW 13:160.
22Luther, LW 13:161.
23Martin Luther, The Disputation Concerning Man (1536), LW 34:137 (nos. 4–8).
24Martin Luther, A Sermon on Keeping Children in School (1530), LW 46:242.
25Luther, LW 13:198.
26Luther, LW 13:199.
27For an excellent overview of this natural law convention, see Porter, Nature as Reason.
reason named then what today we call the sciences, both natural and human. “Na-
ture as reason” is therefore the combined capacity of reason’s two forms, specula-
tive and practical. While the sciences of speculative reason explore the basic nature
and shape of human inclinations, desires, capacities, and needs that are necessary
for human life to flourish, practical reason explores the moral interrelationships,
patterns, and actions that harm or promote the flourishing of natural human life.
Luther himself engaged in this kind of reflection when he took up questions
of the moral life, though he usually did so on quite a popular level, without using
the terms “speculative” and “practical,” for instance.28 His catechisms offer good
examples of how his popular approach to natural law reasoning accrues lapidary
import. Take his explanation of the first article of the Apostles’ Creed in the Small
Catechism, where he logs various necessities of everyday human life that God cre-
ates, gifts, and preserves: body and soul, eyes, ears and various senses along with
reason, house and family, and a range of goods, including government, needed in
order to sustain earthly human flourishing. He combined this kind of popular
speculative reasoning with practical moral reasoning in his explanations of the Ten
Commandments in both catechisms. The Decalogue itself puts into words primar-
ily the “do no harm” side of the first principle of practical reason. Luther, like oth-
ers before and after him, also probed the tacit “do good” side of each of the
commandments.29
Another instance in which Luther combined speculative and practical rea-
soning in his characteristically popular way involved the then big issue of vows of
celibacy and sexual desire. Sexual desire is “just as innate as the organs involved in
it.” He continued, perhaps with slight exaggeration, to describe sexual desire as
“even more necessary than sleeping and waking, eating and drinking, and empty-
ing the bowels and bladder.” It is, therefore, “more than a command…[and] it is
not our prerogative to hinder or ignore” it through artificially forced vows. For this
very reason God establishes the relational estate of marriage so that sexual desire
and its accompanying goods would flourish according to the natural law practical
principle of beneficence. Luther was so versed in natural law commonplaces that
interpreters commonly miss his indebtedness to the tradition.30
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28Luther reserved the term “speculative” for the kind of theology that aspired to gain access to God’s
majesty outside of Christ (see Martin Luther, Lectures on Galatians [1535], LW 26:28).
29See Martin Luther, The Small Catechism and The Large Catechism, in The Book of Concord: The Confessions
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, ed. Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000)
352–354, 400–433.
30Martin Luther, The Estate of Marriage (1522), LW 45:18.
The Decalogue itself puts into words primarily the “do no
harm” side of the first principle of practical reason. Luther,
like others before and after him, also probed the tacit “do
good” side of each of the commandments.
Luther, of course, was well aware of the deep, devastating effects of sin across
the entire spectrum of human life. Luther, following Paul’s hermeneutic of law and
promise, seeks to “magnify sin” in order to maximize Christ.31 Reason after the fall
cannot, therefore, hold a candle to the prelapsarian capacity of human reasoning
even regarding terrestrial life. Famously, Luther was quite the realist about sin, in-
cluding the crippling noetic effects of sin on reason.32 But he was equally the realist
when it came to God’s ongoing creative providence that preserves terrestrial life
even in the face of sin and evil. God has not let this world go completely to the
devil, and this includes reason’s capacities in regard to temporal human life and
flourishing. Luther boldly claimed, “Nor did God after the fall of Adam take away
this majesty of reason, but rather confirmed it.”33 His twofold theological realism
regarding both human sin and divine providence warranted his vigorous use and
innovative interpretation of the natural law “written on our hearts.”
Those who ignore Luther’s critical agility in natural law moral reasoning in
favor of a reactionary turn to a regime of biblical law create “misery and tribula-
tion,” as Luther lamented, and seriously enfeeble the Christian faith for life today.
There is currently an exciting, critical, and innovative revival of natural law moral
reasoning among both Roman Catholics and Reformed Protestants that is ger-
mane in today’s world. Luther’s critical appropriation of natural law offers a par-
ticularly rich vein of hidden treasure, especially his Ciceronian approach to
practical moral reason as he coordinates it with Christian neighborly love—an
excavation for another day.
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This essay continues an argument Simpson began last year in “‘You shall bear witness to me’:





33Luther, LW 34:137; also see Lectures on Galatians (1535), LW 26:173.
